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RELIEF FROM DELINQUENCY PENALTIES:
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
By HERBERT W. REISNER ft
The Internal Revenue Code provides for the imposition of "addi-
tions to the tax" in cases of delinquency, negligence and fraud. Such
additions,. or penalties, are civil incidents of the assessment and col-
lection of the tax.' The so-called delinquency penalties are added to
the tax in case of any failure to file required tax 2 returns and in case
of any failure to file a declaration or to pay an installment of estimated
tax within the prescribed time, unless it is shown that such failures
are due to "reasonable cause" and not due to "willful neglect." This
article deals primarily with these basic provisions for relief from
delinquency penalties.
STATUTORY HISTORY
The principal delinquency penalties are imposed under section 291
in cases of income and additional income taxes (including the personal
holding company surtax and the excess profits tax) ' and under sec-
tA. B., Haverford, 1931; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1934; member,
Pennsylvania Bar; former member of legal staff of The Tax Court of the United
States.
1. "Additions to the tax" are separate liabilities and may be imposed concurrently.
Delinquency and fraud penalties: Hoefle v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 713 (6th Cir.
1940) ; Pincus Brecher, 27 B. T. A. 1108 (1933). Delinquency and negligence penal-
ties: Vahram Chimchirian, 42 B. T. A. 1437 (1940), affd, 125 F. 2d 746 (D. C. Cir.
1942). The principle stated in the text was relied upon by the Supreme Court in
holding that an addition to income tax for fraud was not barred under the doctrine
of double jeopardy by an acquittal on an indictment growing out of the same offense.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938); cf. Hoefle v. Commissioner, supra,
and Henry H. Epstein, 34 B. T. A. 925 (1936), in which civil penalties were
imposed in addition to criminal penalties for the same act or omission. The same
principle was relied upon in ruling that additions to the tax do not abate with death.
G. C. M. 22326, 1940-2 Cumr. BULL. 159, revoking a contrary ruling; followed in
Estate of Charles Louis Reimer, 12 T. C. No. 121 (1949), wherein the addition was
treated as an indemnity for the loss resulting from a wrongful act or tort committed
by the taxpayer.
2. "Additions to the tax" have no application to information returns. However,
criminal penalties may be imposed under INT. REV. CODE § 145, relating to returns
for income tax purposes. See also INT. REv. CODE §§ 340, 3793(b). Civil and
criminal penalties are provided under § 894(b) for estate tax purposes. Criminal
penalties are provided under § 1024 for gift tax purposes.
3. Section 291 is applicable to returns required by Chapter 1 (income tax) and
by general references it is made applicable to returns required by Chapter 2 (addi-
tional income taxes) of the Internal Revenue Code. A personal holding company is
deprived of the right to a deficiency dividend credit under § 506(f) in case of failure
to file a return required under Subchapter A of Chapter 2 within the time prescribed
"unless it is shown that such failure to file is due to reasonable cause and not due
to willful neglect." Section 291 applies to a withholding agent under §§ 143 and
144. A. C. Monk & Co., Inc., 10 T. C. 77 (1948); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T. C. 183,
191 (1947); P. D. Bowlen, 4 T. C. 486 (1944); St. Francis Hospital, 42 B. T. A.
1004 (1940), aff'd, 125 F. 2d 553 (D. C. Cir. 1942). Cf. S. M. 1334, 2 Cum. BULL.
(183)
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tion 3612 (d) (1) in cases of estate and gift taxes.4 Penalties are
imposed under section 294 (d) (1) (A) and (B) in cases of estimated
taxes.5 These three sections of the Code contain similar provisions
for relief which are traceable to a statute of Civil War days, as amended
by the Revenue Act of 1916.
The Revised Statutes provided in section 3176 a penalty of 50
per cent in case of refusal or neglect to file any required return (or
list) "except in cases of sickness or absence." 8 This section was
amended by the Revenue Act of 1916 which provided that the penalty
would not be added when a return was filed late but voluntarily "and
it is shown that the failure to file it was due to a reasonable cause and
not to willful neglect." I The Revenue Act of 1918 reduced the penalty
to 25 per cent." The Revenue Act of 1935 introduced the current
penalty rates of 5 per cent of the tax for each 30 days or fraction
thereof during which the failure to file a required return continues, not
exceeding 25 per cent in the aggregate.9
The penalty was mandatory under the pre-1936 Acts if no return
was filed by the taxpayer, i. e., the penalty could be lifted for reason-
able cause only when the taxpayer filed a late return.10 The require-
229 (1920). Section 291 also applies where an executor or administrator disaffirms
a joint return filed by a surviving spouse. See H. R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. BULL. 283 in connection with the Revenue Act of
1948, §303(4), 62 STAT. 110 (1948).
4. Section 3612(d) (1) is made applicable to returns required by Chapter 3
(estate tax) and Chapter 4 (gift tax) through specific cross-references under INT.
REv. CODE §§ 894 and 1018, respectively. This results in the application of the pre-
1936 rule, note 10 infra, to estate and gift tax cases, note 11 infra.
5. Added to the Code by Act of Feb. 25, 1944, Revenue Act of 1943, § 118(a),
58 STAT. 37 (1943); amended by Act of May 29, 1944, Individual Income Tax Act
of 1944, § 13(b), 58 STAT. 244 (1944).
6. Revised Statutes, § 14, 13 STAT. 226 (1864). The component statutes and the
amendments to § 3176 of the Revised Statutes are referred to in the historical note
under 26 U. S. C. A. § 3612. The provisions in effect prior to 1916 were construed
in L. 0. 1060, 4 Cum. BuLL. 318 (1921).
7. Revenue Act of 1916, § 16, 39 STAT. 773 (1916).
8. And provided that the penalty would be added in case of any failure to file
a return in time "except that when a return is filed after such time and it is shown
that the failure to file it was due to a reasonable cause and not to willful neglect,
no addition shall be made to the tax." Revenue Act of 1918, § 1317, 40 STAT. 1147
(1919).
9. Revenue Act of 1935, § 406, 49 STAT. 1027 (1935). See SEN. REP. No. 1240
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935), 1939-1:2 Cur. BuLL. 651, 658; and CONF. REP.
No. 1885, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935), 1939-1:2 Cum. BULL. 660, 666.
10. Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219 (1944). See cases col-
lected in 10 MERTENS. LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION §55.21 n. 71 (1942).
In Helvering v. Boekman, 107 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir. 1939), reversing on other grounds
38 B. T. A. 541 (1938), a return filed by the Commissioner was held not to be a
compliance with the statute. Cf. J. S. F. Crayton, 11 B. T. A. 1375, 1381 (1928);
John B. Nordholt, 4 B. T. A. 509, 514 (1926); see G. C. M. 17478, 1937-1 Cum.
BULL. 122, revoked by G. C. M. 24110, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 521. In Taylor Securities,
Inc., 40 B. T. A, 696 (1939), returns filed by the taxpayer, after filing its petition
but before hearing, were held to be insufficient to avoid the mandatory operation of
the statute. However, the Board also said there was no evidence for determining
whether the delinquencies were due to reasonable cause. This decision was followed
in Blenheim Co., Ltd., 42 B. T. A. 1248, 1254 (1940), aff'd, 125 F. 2d 906 (4th
Cir. 1942).
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ment of filing a late return has been retained in Code section 3612
(d) (1), an administrative provision which is also applicable to estate
and gift tax delinquencies." However, the 1936 Act 12 eliminated
the requirement of filing a late return in cases of income and addi-
tional income taxes.13 The language of the 1936 Act now appears in
section 291 of the Code with minor technical changes.
Section 294 (d) (1) of the Code, as'added by the Revenue Act
of 1943, also provides penalties of 5 to 10 per cent on installments of
estimated taxes for failure to file a declaration or for failure to pay an
installment of such taxes within the prescribed time, in either case
"unless such failure is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
to be due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect." 14
Throughout the history of these changes and additions the com-
mittees of the Congress have never commented in their reports upon
the provisions for relief from delinquency penalties. There is no ap-
parent reason why mandatory penalties (i. e., in the absence of filing
a late return) were allowed to survive fo- estate and gift tax purposes
after such penalties had been discontinued for income tax purposes.
"REASONABLE CAUSE"
The basic ground for relief from delinquency penalties is a show-
ing that the delinquencies were due to "reasonable cause." This is a
question of fact. 5
The oldest test of "reasonable cause" is to determine whether the
delinquent taxpayer "exercised ordinary business care and prudence."
11. As to gift taxes see Charles Guzy, P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEc. Saav. 49,182
(1949); William Fleming, 3 T. C. 974 (1944), affd, 155 F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946),
without discussion of penalty issue; Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T. C. 298 (1943); see
Carlton B. Overton, 6 T. C. 304, 313 (1946), aft'd, 162 F. 2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947).
In Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T. C. 1059 (1943), the question of reasonable cause
was discussed even though the estate filed no return. Cf. note 10 supra.
12. Revenue Act of 1936, § 291, 49 STAT. 1727 (1936). Under this section the
penalty is added in case of any failure to file a required return in time "unless it is
shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect."
13. Commissioner v. Lane Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219 (1944). On remand the
penalty for 1936 was approved in accordance with a stipulation of the parties. See
also Estate of Frederick C. Kirchner, 46 B. T. A. 578 (1942), in which the Board
clarified the 1936 rule where no return was filed. The Commissioner's regulations
were not amended until five years after the rule had been changed by the statute.
T. D. 5058, 1941-2 Cum. BULL. 156. In Elrod Slug Casting Machine Co., P-H 1948
TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1148,041 (1948), the pre-1936 rule appears to have been fol-
lowed in an income tax case. See also Currier Farms, Inc., P-H 1948 TC MEM.
DEC. SEmv. 48,188 (1949).
14. Section 294(d) (1) (A) and (B). See note 5 supra. Albert T. Felix, 12
T. C. No. 124 (1949).
15. Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co.. 321 U. S. 219 (1944), citing Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1944). Cf. Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.
2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1947), with P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F. 2d 269 (4th
Cir. 1946), cert. den. 331 U. S. 838 (1947). The penalty issue was tried by a jury
in Reliance Feed & Grain Co. v. Shaughnessy, 84 F. Supp. 389 (N. D. N. Y. 1949).
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The business prudence test was employed first by the Commissioner
in the revised Regulations applicable to the Revenue Act of 1916.1"
As modified by the Regulations applicable to the 1921 Act,17 this test
has appeared in all of the Regulations relating to the income tax sub-
stantially as follows: 18
• . . If the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and pru-
dence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the
prescribed time, then the delay is due to a reasonable cause.
The Regulations have not been cited in many cases, probably
because the regulatory test implies that all taxpayers must have been
not only prudent but also "unable" to file returns in order to qualify
for relief. The current judicial view is that "reasonable cause means
nothing more than the exercise of ordinary business care and pru-
dence." " In Spies- v. United States,2" a criminal case, the Supreme
Court said of all penalties (including delinquency penalties):
. . . It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference
of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of rea-
sonable care. Such errors are corrected by the assessment of
the deficiency of tax and its collection with interest for the
delay.
Relief from delinquency penalties is not restricted to cases of
prudent taxpayers who were also unable to file returns. Subsequent
discussion will show, for example, that a belief that no return was
required, founded upon a reasonable basis, is a "reasonable cause"
within the meaning of the statute.
16. U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (Revised), art. 54 292 (1918), provided as to indi-
viduals: "'Reasonable cause', for the purpose of this article of the regulations, is
held to be such a condition of fact as had the taxpayer in default exercised ordinary
business' care and prudence it would have been impracticable or impossible for him
to have filed return on the prescribed time." Cf. id., art. 54 i[ 644 (as to corporation).
17. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62. art. 1004 (1922) (relating to Income Tax and War
Profits and Excess Profits Tax).
18. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.291-1 (1943). The booklet issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, YouR FEDERAL INCOME TAX II (1948), states that "reasonable
cause does not include ignorance of the law, forgetfulness, carelessness, oversight, or
any other trivial cause. The cause for late filing must be substantial." This is a fair
but incomplete statement of the case law.
19. Orient Investment & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 601 (D. C.
Cir. 1948); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1947); South-
eastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 205 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Girard Invest-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 699
(1942) ; Nathan Blum, 5 T. C. 702 (1945) ; cf. Charles E. Pearsall & Son, 29 B. T. A.
747 (1934) in which it was said: "'Reasonable cause' . . . means such a cause as
would prompt an ordinarily intelligent and prudent business man to have so acted
under similar circumstances."
20. 317 U. S. 492, 496 (1943).
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The statute expressly places a burden on the taxpayer to show
that the delinquency was due to "reasonable cause" and not due to
"willful neglect." The books are full of cases in which penalties
have been approved for lack of any evidence whatsoever, but if the
taxpayer has discharged his burden of showing "reasonable cause"
the chances are that the same evidence also shows the absence of
"willful neglect:" 21 The converse, however, is not true. The absence
of "willful neglect" is not alone sufficient to avoid the imposition of
delinquency penalties."
In some delinquency cases the principal question is whether a
return filed within the prescribed time was a sufficient return.2" This
question goes beyond the scope of the present discussion. If the return
was insufficient the penalty is mandatory under section 3612 (d) (1)
as to gift and estate taxes but it is not mandatory as to income taxes
under section 291 of the Code. If the return was sufficient (and filed
within the prescribed time) the question of "reasonable cause" is of
course moot. Similarly, the question of "reasonable cause" is moot in
cases where no return was required,24 or where no tax was due.25
The leading cases involving what the taxpayer must show to
establish "reasonable cause" will be discussed in the following pages.
The main topics deal respectively with delinquencies caused primarily
by (1) taxpayers, (2) their agents and (3) their advisors.
DELINQUENCIES CAUSED BY TAXPAYERS
There are so few reported cases of delinquencies caused by events
beyond the control of prudent taxpayers that such cases are considered
here under a broad title. It is very important, however, to distinguish
between the delinquencies caused by taxpayers who claim that they
were unable to file a required return in time, and those who claim a
belief that no return was required and filed none. The business pru-
dence test should be applied to both groups. Paradoxically, although
21. In P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F. 2d 269, 273 (4th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 838 (1947), it was said that "one who searches for the motives
underlying human conduct in a particular field is on uncertain ground when he tries
to determine where willful neglect endn and reasonable cause be.lins" (Italics supplied).
22. See George S. Van Schaich, Supt. of Insurance, 32 B. T. A. 736, 744 (1935),
aff'd, 83 F. 2d 940 (2d Cir. 1936); Charles E. Pearsall & Son, 29 B. T. A. 747 (1934).
In Estate of Samuel Goldstein, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEC. SEv. 1 47,220 (July 30,
1947) the court said: "There could be neglect without willfulness and by the same
token there could be lack of reasonable cause, even though no willful intent was
present."
23. What constitutes a sufficient return is discussed in 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FED-
ERAL INcOME TAXATION 55.22 and notes (1942). Cf. id. at 1 57.12 et seq.
24. Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc., 4 T. C. 280, 286 (1944); Pacific Northwest
Finance Corporation, 3 T. C. 498, 507 (1944).
25. Robert Hughes & Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 720 (8th Cir. 1940) ; 415
South Taylor Building Corp., 2 T. C. 184, 193 (1943).
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this test is applied by the Regulations only to the first group, it has
been more frequently applied by the courts to the second group.
Inability to File a Required Return
The Regulations have always excused the inability to file a re-
quired return in time if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care
and prudence in an attempt to file on time.2" In a few cases delinquency
penalties were lifted by the Board of Tax Appeals (now Tax Court)
on meager evidence of the impossibility of filing returns.27  The Tax
Court has given relief from a delinquency penalty where a taxpayer
showed that it was involved in extensive litigation and was unable
to marshall its records in time for the preparation of its return.2 The
delay in filing returns has been held not due 'to reasonable cause,
however, where the task of preparing the returns was clearly burden-
some but not impossible.
2 9
The most recent cases require the highest degree of proof. In
Nirosta Corporation,"° which is perhaps the extreme example, the
taxpayer failed to file required personal holding company returns for
the years 1938 through 1942. Deficiencies were determined and
penalties were added by the Commissioner for 1938, 1939 and 1942;
all were paid except the penalty for 1942. The taxpayer contended
that it was impossible to determine the ownership of more than half
of its stock which had been held successively by a German, a Dutch
and a Swiss company, and finally had been seized by the Alien Property
Custodian. Although the Tax Court took judicial notice that the
United States was at war with Germany during the years 1942 and
1943, it reasoned as follows:
• . there was no evidence introduced, nothing stipulated, and
nothing in the facts of which this Court may take judicial notice
which would show the impossibility of procuring the information
which the taxpayer deemed necessary before it could file a per-
sonal holding company tax return. The fact that this country
and Germany were at war in 1942 and 1943 undoubtedly would
26. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.291-1 (1943). See notes 16, 17 and 18 supra.
27. In Philad Co. of Delaware, 47 B. T. A. 565, 570 (1942), a taxpayer was
"unable to determine the correct amount of income to be accrued" but apparently
did not show why it was unable to do so. In Millard D. Olds, 15 B. T. A. 560, 564
(1929), aff'd without discussion of penalty, 60 F. 2d 252 (6th Cir. 1932), a taxpayer
who was a partner delayed in filing his individual return because he was unable to r
obtain a partnership return form.
28. Hendrick Ranch Royalties, P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1143,137 (1943).
29. George S. Van Schaick, Supt. of Insurance, 32 B. T. A. 736, 744 (1935),
aff'd without discussion of penalty, 83 F. 2d 940 (2d Cir. 1936); Erie Forge Co.,
P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1145,384 (1945), aff'd, 167 F. 2d 71 (3rd Cir. 1948) ;
N\athan Blum, 5 T. C. 702, 712 (1945) (applied the test of ordinary business care
and prudence).
30. 8 T. C. 987, 990 (1947). Cf. Oak Commercial Corp., 9 T. C. 947, 955
(1947), aff'd as modified, 172 F. 2d 896 (2d Cir. 1949) (taxpayer abandoned penalty
issue).
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make the procurement of such information difficult, but this
Court can not take judicial notice that the procurement of such
information was impossible and the taxpayer has given us no
evidence that it even made any attempt during 1942 and 1943 to
procure this information.
The court approved the penalties without mention of the business
prudence test.
Although sickness and absence were once statutory grounds for
relief,8 mere absence is no longer an excuse.3 Delinquencies have
been held to be due to reasonable cause, where an executrix, as well
as her attorney, had incapacitating illnesses."
Belief That No Return Was Required
The American Bar Association recently proposed an amendment
of the statute to provide that "a belief that no return was required,
founded upon a reasonable basis, shall be deemed reasonable cause." 4
This is a concise restatement of the current case law. The real prob-
lem in most cases is to show that the delinquent taxpayer had a basis
for his belief.3
Many cases hold that mere ignorance of the law is not a reason-
able cause for delinquency. 6 Many others hold that a mere belief,
31. See note 6 supra.
32. John Balestreri, 47 B. T. A. 241, 246 (1942); see Paul E. Reinhold, P-H
1948 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 1148,196 (1948); M. & F. Holding Corp., 26 B. T. A.
504, 508 (1932) ; but see Bankers Dairy Credit Corp., 26 B. T. A. 886, 888 (1932).
33. Estate of Frederick C. Kirchner, 46 B. T. A. 578, 582 (1942) ; Estate of K.
Threefoot, 9 B. T. A. 499 (1927) (facts showed sickness).
34. See pamphlet by Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Racom-
MENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN FEDERAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 15 (1947). The
recommendation includes other provisions which would authorize the Commissioner
to modify the effects of penalties under §§291 and 506(f) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
35. The Section of Taxation incorrectly states that the problem is as follows:
"Considerable hardship has resulted from decisions of the courts holding that the
imposition of penalties is mandatory even in cases where taxpayers honestly believe
that no return was due, such as where corporations honestly believe themselves not to
be personal holding companies which failed to file form 1120-H, where corporations
honestly believe themselves not to be subject to excess profits taxes and therefore
fail to file excess profits tax returns, etc. The courts have expressed sympathy for
the taxpayers but have stated that the remedy lies in the hands of Congress. In the
case of a personal holding company, failure to file return not only results in the 25
per cent penalty under section 291(a) but also deprives the corporation of the right
to declare deficiency dividends (section 506(f)), which is often much more costly
than the 25 per cent penalty." Ibid. This comment seems to be based on the decision
in O'Sullivan Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 721 (1940), aff'd, 120 F. 2d
845 (2nd Cir. 1941), which involved the Revenue Act of 1934 aid in which it was
held that the penalty for failure to file any personal holding company return was
mandatory. See note 10 supra. Under subsequent Revenue Acts and under the
Internal Revenue Code the penalty is no longer mandatory. Note 13 mspra.
36. Southeastern Finance Co., 4 T. C. 1069, 1087 (1945), af'd, 153 F. 2d 205
(5th Cir. 1946); Tarbox Corp., 6 T. C. 35 (1946); see also Frank W. Ross, 44
B. T. A. 1, 17 (1941) ; Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., Ltd., 43 B. T. A. 1086, 1089 (1941) ;
Chas. E. Pearsall & Son, 29 B. T. A. 747, 749 (1934); Joseph G. Hitner, P-H
1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 1143,081 (1943); Balfour, Williamson & Co., Ltd., P-H
1943 TC MEa. DEC. SERV. 1143,157 (1943).
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contrary to the law, is not a reasonable cause for delinquency.37 In
such cases the taxpayer has not shown any basis for testing the rea-
sonableness of his belief that no return was required. In West Side
Tennis Club v. Commissioner 8 it was said:
. . . We regret that the imposition of this penalty which the
Board has affirmed is necessary, for the liability of the club to
taxation was by no means clear. Nevertheless the burden of
establishing reasonable cause was upon the taxpayer and it has
not shown a timely effort to get advice or to secure a ruling and
has rested its case on the finding of the Board that the officers
and directors believed that it was exempt. But this, without
more, was not sufficient. As the Board correctly said: "We do
not know the steps taken by petitioner to ascertain its status as
a taxpayer, and without knowledge of the basis for the belief of
its officers and directors that it was exempt from tax we are in
no position to test the reasonableness of the conclusion.-" [Italics
supplied]
On the other hand, in Fairfax Mutual Wood Products Co.3"
the taxpayer successfully claimed relief from the penalty on the basis
of its belief that it was exempt from excess profits tax as a personal
service corporation under section 725 (a) of the Code, as amended.
A statement was attached to its income tax return which explained
why it considered itself exempt under the statute. It further elected
to be so classified and stated that its stockholders had included their
share of undistributed profits in their individual returns. The Tax
Court held as follows:
.... We do not think that we are warranted in holding that a
corporation claiming the benefits of section 725, supra, does so
37. Cedarburg Canning Co. v. Commission, 149 F. 2d 526 (7th Cir. 1945),
afflrming P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 1144,095 (1944); Burford Oil Co., 4 T. C.
613, 618 (1945), aff'd, 153 F. 2d 745 (5th Cir. 1946); Rafael Sabatini, 32 B. T. A.
705, 713 (1935), aff'd on penalty issue, 98 F. 2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938), in which the
circuit court said, "The taxpayer may well have believed that he was liable for no
taxes and yet have had no reasonable cause for not filing returns." Id. at 756. In
many cases it is impossible to tell from the report whether the court thought that
there was no basis, or that there was not a reasonable basis, for the taxpayer's
belief. See Home Builders Lumber Co., P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. 146,282
(1946), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1948); Philip Suetter, P-H 1946 TC MEa.
DEC. SERV. 1146,247 (1946); P. D. Bowlen, 4 T. C. 486, 494 (1944); Central Ap-
praisal Bureau, P-H 1942 B. T. A. MEAs. DEc. SERV. 1142,235 (1942); R. Simpson
& Co., 44 B. T. A. 498. 501 (1941) ; af'd, 128 F. 2d 742 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. dimnissed,
321 U. S. 225 (1944).
38. 111 F. 2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming 39 B. T. A. 149, 160 (1939), cert.
denied, 311 U. S. 674 (1940). This case followed Jockey Club, 30 B. T. A. 670, 678
(1934), aff'd, 76 F. 2d 597 (2d Cir. 1935), on the principal issue but distinguished
that case on the penalty issue because there the taxpayer filed blank returns within
the time prescribed by law and claimed exemption. It is doubtful whether the Jockey
Club case is good law on the penalty issue today. See Automotive Electric Associa-
tion, 8 T. C. 894, 902 (1947), aff'd without discussion of penalty issue, 168 F. 2d 366
(6th Cir. 1948).
39. 5 T. C. 1279, 1283 (1945).
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at its peril. An election, in good faith, based upon an analysis
of its own business should not, we think, open the way to the
imposition of the penalty if such election be an erroneous one.
Petitioner did not willfully neglect to file an excess profits tax
return, but advisedly refrained from filing in a reasonable belief
that none was required of it. It is not the purpose of the law to
penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made
despite the exercise of reasonable care. Such errors are corrected
by the assessment of the deficiency of tax and its collection with
interest for the delay. Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492.
The imposition of the delinquency penalty under section 291 (a)
is not justified.
Other cases involve the narrower question whether the basis for
the taxpayer's belief was reasonable.
In P. Dougherty Co.4" the taxpayer did not file an excess profits
tax return because its officers believed that it did not have any excess
profits net income for the taxable year. It filed an income and de-
clared value excess profits tax return in which it reported a net loss
resulting from depreciation and loss deductions. No excess profits
tax return was required under the statute if the excess profits net
income was not greater than $5,000. The Tax Court held that some
of the adjustments made by the Commissioner were proper for income
and excess profits tax purposes but that "It is yet to be determined
under Rule 50 computation, in accordance with our opinion herein,
whether there will be any excess profits tax due for the taxable year."
The Court also held that the penalty was properly added by the Com-
missioner because "there is no proof whatever that the good faith of
the petitioner or its belief that it had no excess profits tax net income
was based on reasonable grounds." Five judges, dissenting, took the
view that the errors made by the taxpayer in its income tax return
were innocently made. The Circuit Court affirmed the majority de-
cision because it thought that the question was one of fact, peculiarly
within the province of the Tax Court.
In Economy Savings & Loan Co.41 the taxpayer was a building
and loan association which kept its books and filed its returns on a fiscal
40. 5 T. C. 791, 800 (1945), aff'd, 159 F. 2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U. S. 838 (1947), followed in Home Guaranty Abstract Co., 8 T. C. 617, 622
(1947); Donald V. Smith, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 147,137 (1947). Cf.
Wass & Stinson Canning Co., P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. SEav. 45,350 (1945);
Ardbern Co:, Ltd., 41 B. T. A. 910, 928 (1940), aff'd on penalty issue, 120 F. 2d 424
(4th Cir. 1941); Nathan Stein, 40 B. T. A. 848, 855 (1939), aff'd without discussion
of penalty, 115 F. 2d 468 (4th Cir. 1940); T. H. Symington & Son, Inc., 35 B. T. A.
711, 739 (1937). Contra: Fajardo Sugar Co. of Porto Rico, 20 B. T. A. 980, 989
(1930) (Board said the taxpayer had not been guilty of willful neglect but did not
mention reasonable cause). See Herbert Marshall, 41 B. T. A. 1064, 1072 (1940).
41. 5 T. C. 543, 552 (1945), rev'd on pendty issue, 158 F. 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1946),
followed in Standard Fruit Product Co., TC Mem. Op. (Aug. 22, 1949).
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year basis ending September 30. It had an exempt status until Feb-
ruary 1, 1940, when it changed its method of operation by doing most
of its business thereafter with non-shareholders. The principal ques-
tion was whether its taxable year began in 1939 or 1940, since the
Second Revenue Act of 1940 imposed new income tax rates and the
excess profits tax for years beginning after 1939. The taxpayer filed
an income tax return for the year ended Septehnber 30, 1940, which
was prorated for the last eight months and computed under the rates
imposed by the Revenue Act of 1938. It did not file any excess profits
tax return. Its officers believed that its taxable year began in 1939
and therefore that no return was required. The Tax Court held that
the taxable year began in 1940 and sustained the taxes under the 1940
Act. It also sustained the penalty on the theory that there was no
evidence offered in support of the taxpayer's belief that no return was
required. The Circuit Court reversed the latter decision. It said:
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's assessment,
with three members dissenting. The court held that petitioner
had not shown its failure to file the required return was due to
reasonable cause. We think the record conclusively shows that
petitioner was not guilty of any wilful neglect in failing to file
the return, and that it just as conclusively shows that the tax-
payer did have a reasonable cause for its failure to make the
return. The record discloses that petitioner not only believed
that the excess profits tax return was not required, but that this
belief was founded upon reasonable grounds, which are cogently
set forth in the forceful brief filed in its behalf.
The excess profits tax did not accrue until December 31,
1939, and there were substantial grounds for the conclusion that
petitioner's taxable year began on October of that year., While
these considerations were not accepted by us, they n1evertheless
do afford a reasonable basis for petitioner's contention. Just
what constitutes a taxable year or a taxable period within the
year has been a matter of much concern and not free from am-
biguity . . . so much so in fact, as to require a clarifying amend-
ment (Act Oct. 21, 1942) to Sec. 48 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
A taxpayer should not be penalized for making an honest
effort upon reasonable grounds to avoid what he in good faith
believes to be an unreasonable exaction.
Although the Tax Court had not passed on the question of rea-
sonableness in this case the Circuit Court held that the taxpayer's
belief was founded upon a reasonable basis. In the Dougherty case
42. 158 F. 2d 472, 474 (6th Cir. 1946). The Tax Court recently took a similar
view in Twin Oaks Co., P-H 1949 TC MEar. DEc. SsRV. 149,067 (1949), wherein
it said that the officers of a corporate taxpayer "honestly deemed" a partnership
recognizable for tax purposes.
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the Tax Court had found that the taxpayer's belief was not based on
reasonable grounds. These cases thus could be distinguished. The
significance of both cases to the present discussion is the observance
of the principle that a belief, founded upon a reasonable basis, is a
reasonable cause for delinquency.
43
An act or omission of the Commissioner or his agents may give
support to the reasonableness of a taxpayer's belief that no return was
required. In two recent cases delinquency penalties were lifted where
the taxpayers and revenue agents apparently took the same view of
similar facts for preceding years, which circumstances afforded a rea-
sonable cause for delinquency during the taxable years.44  Penalties
have also been lifted where returns of income, held taxable to a grantor,
were filed by beneficiaries and accepted over a period of years; "
where a taxpayer was "lulled" into a belief that no return was re-
quired by instructions contained upon or given out with tax blanks; 46
where the Commissioner's ruling that future returns would not be
required was changed after the taxpayer had failed to file such re-
turns ; 4' and where the Commissioner had taken an inconsistent posi-
tion in similar cases. 4s These circumstances were considered in testing
the reasonableness of a belief on the part of the taxpayer; they were
not considered as being in the nature of an estoppel against the Com-
missioner. They would not relieve a taxpayer from the requirement
of filing a late return for gift and estate taxes under section 3612 (d)
(1) of the Code.49 In a recent case, however, relief was denied where
the record failed to show that the Commissioner's agent was employed
for the purpose of advising taxpayers or that he had such information
as would enable him to give reliable advice.8 0
43. The Tax Court's majority and minority opinions in the Dougherty case,
note 40 supra, rest upon this principle. The circuit court appears to have applied the
Dobson rule to the majority view but it also said: ". . . in a number of decisions
of the Tax Court, affirmed by the Courts of Appeals, it has been held that an inno-
cent mistake by a taxpayer which leads him to believe that he is not required to
file a return is of itself insufficient to show that his failure was due to reasonable
cause within the meaning of the statute. . . . " 159 F. 2d 269, 273 (4th Cir. 1946).
The cases cited in support of this statement all involved a mere belief, without proof
of any basis."
44. Hugh Smith, Inc., 8 T. C. 660, 676 (1947), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 224 (6th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 337 U. S. 918 (1949), followed in Druggists Supply Corp., 8 T. C.
1343, 1351 (1947).
45. William A. Frease, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEc. SERv. f 44,235 (1944), aff'd
per curiam, 150 F. 2d 403 (6th Cir. 1945).
46. Danville Perpetual Bldg. Loan & Savings Co., P-H 1942 B. T. A. MEi. DEC.
SERv. 1 42,438 (1942).
47. German Hungarian Home Co., P-H 1942 B. T. A. MEm. DEC. S8mv. 42,427
(1942).
48. Edward S. Moore, P-H 1942 B. T. A. MEm. DEC. SuRv. 1 42,451 (1942).
49. Cf. Searles Real Estate Trust, 25 B. T. A. 1115, 1120 (1932) (neither the
Commissioner nor his agents could waive the requirement of filing a late return under
§ 3176 of the Revised Statutes, as amended).
50. Lawrence Block Co., 12 T. C. 366 (1949).
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Reliance upon an order restraining the collector from requiring
a return is a reasonable cause for delinquency.5 Similarly, a taxpayer
would be entitled to rely upon the favorable decision of another case
like his own-but not if and after the decision had been reversed.52
If the basis for a taxpayer's belief in his own case has been upheld
by a lower court, however, it should be substantial support for the
reasonableness of such belief notwithstanding a subsequent reversal.
5
3
A novel question has been considered as a proper circumstance for
testing the reasonableness of a belief that no return was required.5"
These cases raise the interesting question of whether a dissenting
opinion on the merits in the taxpayer's own case would afford relief
from a delinquency penalty. It should certainly resolve the question
of reasonableness but it should not relieve the taxpayer of the burden
of showing that the minority position was in fact the basis of his
belief. In Palm Beach Trust Company,5 the penalty was approved
by the Tax Court, notwithstanding dissent, where no evidence was
introduced to show the basis for the taxpayer's erroneous belief that
a personal holding company surtax return was required. On appeal
before the Circuit Court, which avoided this narrow issue, the penalty
was lifted because "there was a question debatable in good faith." "
The Circuit Court did not consider whether the question had been
"debated" by the taxpayer prior to the delinquency.
DELINQUENCIES CAUSED BY AGENTS
The duty of filing a tax return when due " is a personal duty of
the taxpayer himself. He cannot escape that burden by delegating
it to an agent. In cases where the taxpayer has delegated the filing
51. J. I. Beale, Jr., P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEc. SERV. 146,087 (1946).
52. Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Eaton, 27 F. 2d 530 (2d Cir. 1928), rev'd, 34
F. 2d 129 (2d Cir. 1929) (original return was sufficient under Revised Statutes
§ 3176, as amended).
53. Commissioner v. Clarion Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 671 (D. C. Cir. 1945), reversing
1 T. C. 751 (1943), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 881 (1945); but see United States v.
Archer, Adm., 174 F. 2d 353, 356 (1st Cir. 1949), reversihW 77 F. Supp. 919 (D.
Mass. 1948).
54. Agricultural Securities Corp., 39 B. T. A. 1103, 1105 (1939), aff'd per curiam,
116 F. 2d 800 (9th Cir. 1947); William H. Gross, 7 T. C. 837, 848 (1946) (both
cases of which involved advisors).
55. 9 T. C. 1060, 1068 (1947).
56. 174 F. 2d 527 (D. C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1949).
57. The regulations provide that a return received after the due date will not be
regarded as delinquent if "made and placed in the mails in due course, properly
addressed and postage paid, in ample time to reach the office of the collector on or
before the due date." U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.53-4 (1943); U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, § 81.63 (1942); U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.22 (1943). Estate of Frederick L.
Flinchbaugh, 1 T. C. 653 (1943); Joseph Shalleck, P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEc. SERv.
142,684 (1942); Capento Securities Corp., 47 B. T. A. 691 (1942), aff'd onl other
issues, 140 F. 2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944). Compare Crude Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,
161 F. 2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947), reversing 6 T. C. 648 (1946), with Irvine F. Belser,
10 T. C. 1031 (1948), aff'd, 174 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1949) (petition for certiorari
filed).
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of a return to another, his agent's conduct is tested for reasonable
cause, and the lack of such cause is charged to the taxpayer. Penalties
have been approved where the delinquencies were caused by the igno-
rance,5 forgetfulness, 9 carelessness,60 oversight,0 ' and willful neglect 2
of agents. Berlin. v. Commissioner 63 is a frequently cited example.
In that case the taxpayer could be relieved from delinquency penalty
only by successfully claiming the benefit of an accountant's efforts to
procure an extension of time for filing a return. But the accountant
had failed to make a bona fide estimate of tax on which the extension
was conditioned. The taxpayer's final return was held to be delinquent
because the agent's delinquency was without reasonable cause.
DELINQUENCIES CAUSED BY ADVISORS
The agency cases considered in the previous section dealt with
situations where the taxpayer entrusted another to file his return
for him. Those cases must be distinguished carefully from cases in
which the taxpayer, relying upon the advice of an attorney or ac-
countant that no return is required, files no return at all, neither per-
sonally nor by an agent. We turn now to this latter situation.
Dayton, Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan " was an early, if not the
earliest, case to be decided under section 3176 of the Revised Statutes,
as amended in 1916. In that case the taxpayer was engaged in manu-
facturing castings which were used by others in the manufacture of
three-inch shrapnel shells. It had filed a late return and brought suit
against the collector to recover certain munitions taxes and penalties
which it had paid under protest. Evidence was offered that it believed
in good faith that it was not required to pay the tax and that it was so
advised by reputable counsel. On those facts and under a contemporary
58. Estate of Arthur D. Cronin, 7 T. C. 1403, 1413 (1946), vnodified on other
issues, 164 F. 2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Eagle Piece Dye Works, 10 B. T. A. 1360, 1368
(1928).
59. Frischkorn Development Co., 30 B. T. A. 8, 14 (1934), aff'd on other isses,
88 F. 2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1937) ; Rogers Hornsby, 26 B. T. A. 591, 593 (1932); Gus.
V. Winston, 22 ]3. T. A. 1194, 1199 (1931).
60. Estate of Abraham Werbelovsky, 9 T. C. 689 (1947); Estate of Samuel
Goldstein, P-H 1947 TC MEam. DEC. SERV. 47,220 (1947); Malcolm Clifton Daven-
port, 6 T. C. 62, 67 (1946) ; see Estate of Charles Curie, 4 T. C. 1175, 1184 (1945).
61. George S. Groves, 38 B. T. A. 727, 738 (1938); American Milk Products
Corp. v. United States, 41 F. 2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1930) ; but see Carnie-Goudie Mfg. Co.,
18 B. T. A. 893, 900 (1930), rev'd on other issues, 24 B. T. A. 679 (1931), followed
Bouvelt Realty, Inc., 46 B. T. A. 45, 48 (1942) (oversight of agents is reasonable
cause). Cf. Paul E. Reinhold, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. 48,196 (1948). In
the Carnie-Goudie case the Board said there was no willful neglect and did not
consider whether the delay was due to reasonable cause.
62. Pioneer Automobile Service Co., 36 B. T. A. 213, 221 (1937); Axel Holm-
strom, 35 B. T. A. 1092, 1105 (1937).
63. 59 F. 2d 996 (2d Cir. 1932), affirming P-H 1931 B. T. A. MEM. DEC. SERv.
[31,063 cert. denied, 287 U. S. 642 (1932).
64. 281 Fed. 709 (6th Cir. 1922).
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Treasury ruling 65 the court relieved the taxpayer from the penalties.
The court said in part: 66
The attendant and surrounding circumstances of this case
have no tendency whatever to cast, a doubt or suspicion upon the
good faith of the taxpayer. While the fact that it sought and
obtained legal advice, in and of itself, might not be sufficient to
excuse its failure to file this return, neveitheless it tends to show
that the taxpayer was acting in good faith and availed itself of
the best means at its command to determine, honestly and fairly,
the question of its liability. That counsel was mistaken in the
advice given to the taxpayer is not at all surprising . . . [citing
conflicting decisions]. It would therefore appear that the officers
of this company were honestly mistaken as to its liability to pay
this tax and that under the order of the Treasury Department
above referred to, in the absence of circumstances having a
tendency to cast doubt and suspicion upon its good faith, its
ignorance of its liability to pay this tax is sufficient to constitute
a reasonable cause for failure to make and file a return within
the time prescribed by law.
The Dayton case is often cited but the reasoning used by the
Court is no longer followed. The advice of counsel was treated in
that case merely as evidence of the taxpayer's good faith. The court
implied that ignorance of liability, coupled with good faith, was suffi-
cient to constitute reasonable cause for delinquency. It is clear from
later cases that a taxpayer may be ignorant of the law, in good faith,
and yet have no reasonable cause for failure to file a required return.
Nevertheless a general requirement of good faith has been kept alive
in the cases.
The modern reasoning is best illustrated by a recent Circuit Court
opinion in Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner,17 which reversed a Tax
Court finding and decision. Hatfried, Inc., owned a hotel in Florida
which it rented to its sole stockholder and from which it derived its
entire gross income. No dividends were paid during the taxable year.
All tax returns were prepared and filed by a certified public accountant.
He was advised of the facts and circumstances surrounding the lease
65. L. 0.818, 1 Cum. BULL. 247 (1919), which provided as follows: "Where the
attendant and surrounding circumstances have a tendency to cast doubt and suspicion
upon a taxpayer, a plea of mere ignorance is not sufficient to constitute a reasonable
cause for failure to make and file a return within time prescribed by law for the
purpose of being relieved of the penalty."
66. 281 Fed. 709, 712 (6th Cir. 1922).
67. 162 F. 2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1947), reversing P-H 1946 TC MEMT. DEc. Sav.
146,037 (1946) (on penalty issue). The advice of an account in the HatfrLed case
was treated by the circuit court as the basis of the taxpayer's belief that no return
was required; in the Dayton case the advice of an attorney was treated merely as
evidence of the taxpayer's good faith. In the Hatfred case ignorance of the law was
regarded as immaterial where the taxpayer had relied upon a competent advisor;
in the Dayton case ignorance of law was coupled with good faith to provide the
basis for relief from penalty.
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but he "never suggested the filing of a personal holding company sur-
tax return and none was filed." The income and declared value
excess profits tax return was in evidence. It showed that the tax-
payer's voting stock was owned by one person but it did not show
that the taxpayer's rental income was received from its sole stock-
holder. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was a personal holding
company under the statute, that its rental income was personal holding
company income within the meaning of section 502 (f) of the Code.
It further found and held that there was no reasonable cause for the
failure to file a personal holding company surtax return. It said that
the evidence was too meager to establish the reasonable cause sufficient
to relieve the taxpayer frotn penalty for such delinquency. The Third
Circuit Court affirmed the imposition of the tax but lifted the penalty.
On the latter issue it held that the Tax Court's finding was without
substantial basis in the evidence and that the meaning of section 291
had been misinterpreted. The circuit court said that the preparation
of the income tax return by the accountant and the statements made
therein showed that the taxpayer had been advised by the accountant
and had relied upon his advice in failing to file a personal holding
company surtax return. One judge dissented on the ground that the
question of reliance was one of fact which should be determined by
the Tax Court. But he agreed with the majority proposition that
"the taxpayer who presents his facts to a lawyer or certified public
accountant and relies on the advice given him by either one of these
persons has proved that he has acted with reasonable cause and has
negatived the charge of wilful neglect." 68
The real significance of the Hatfried case lies in the fact, assumed
by the Circuit Court, that the taxpayer was advised by an accountant
in ignorance of the law. The Government contended that ignorance
of the law is no excuse, whether the ignorance is the fault of the tax-
payer or his advisor. Apparently there was no evidence that the
accountant had made any effort to acquaint himself with the personal
holding company law. The Circuit Court' implied that such evidence
would be immaterial under the circumstances. It expressly repudiated
the view that taxpayers should be held liable for the conduct of lawyers
or accountants who are entrusted with the duty of preparing their
tax returns. The court rested its decision on the theory that Hatfried,
Inc., had, in fact and law, exercised such ordinary business care and
prudence as to constitute reasonable cause for its delinquency. The
rationale of the decision is revealed by the following extracts from the
opinion: 69
68. 162 F. 2d 628, 635 (3rd Cir. 1947).
69. Id. at 632-635.
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We approach the problem, whether there was any substan-
tial basis for the Tax Court's finding, with these principles in
mind: (1) "Reasonable cause means nothing more than the ex-
ercise of ordinary business care and prudence." Southeastern
Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 153 F. 2d 205; Girard Inv.
Co. v. Commissioner, supra, 122 F. 2d at page 848. and (2) the
penalties imposed under the revenue laws were designed to attach
to conduct of a taxpayer "which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental" (United States v.
Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394, 54 S. Ct. 223, 225, 78 L. Ed. 381)
as evidenced by the words in Section 291 "and not due to willful
neglect."
The Courts, as above stated, have ruled that "reasonable
cause means nothing more than the exercise of ordinary business
care and prudence" and "willful" as "intentional, or knowing or
voluntary."
To hold that a taxpayer who selects as his agent a certified
public accountant (to, whom as a class the Treasury Department
and the Tax Court itself accord recognition as "experts" and as
"counsel") has failed to exercise "ordinary business care and
prudence" and becomes liable for the error of his advisor as
"agent" is an inconceivable proposition.
It is evident from the foregoing that (1) the finding that
there was no "reasonable cause" was without "substantial basis";
and (2) the Tax Court erred as a matter of law in the interpre-
tation of the legal content of the words "reasonable cause" and
"willful neglect" as used in Section 291.
The court concluded that good faith was shown by the fact that
the taxpayer had made a full disclosure of the facts to its accountant.
It thereby distinguished Tarbox Corporation,"0 a case in which the
Tax Court had approved a delinquency penalty. In this case the
income tax return of a personal holding company, prepared by an
accountant, contained statements which were contrary to fact. Such
statements naturally raised a doubt whether sufficient information was
made available to the accountant to enable him to give intelligent
advice. The court said it was difficult to determine whether the tax-
payer's failure to file the return was due to the fact that its advisor
had "insufficient" information or was "unfamiliar" with the require-
ments of the taxing statute. It held that neither was sufficient excuse.
The Hatfried case is clearly in conflict with the implication of the
70. 6 T. C. 35 (1946). Cf. Beam v. Hamilton, 289 Fed. 9 (6th Cir. 1923);
The 1040 Springfield Ave. Corp., P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 49,065 (1949) ;
Baynard Co., P-H 1942 B. T. A. MEm. DEc. SERv. 142,395 (1942), remanded, 135
F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1943); Jupiter Oil Co., P-H 1939 B. T. A. MEm. DEC. SERV.
139,523 (1939).
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latter point, i. e., that the taxpayer should be responsible for a reputable
advisor's ignorance of law.
The court further (and erroneously) 7 concluded that the ac-
countant had made a full disclosure of the facts to the Commissioner
through the statements made in the Hatfried income tax return. How-
ever, the Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co.72
that the filing of corporate income tax returns did not satisfy the re-
quirement of filing separate personal holding company surtax returns.
Moreover, although the income tax returns did not disclose the tax-
payer's status to the Commissioner, the Court remanded the case
for a finding on the subject of reasonable cause for the failure to file
the holding company returns. Therefore, it seems clear that neither
the disclosure, nor non-disclosure, of facts to the Commissioner is
important for purposes of relief from delinquency penalties.73 On the
other hand, the failure to disclose facts to an advisor is relevant for
the purpose of discrediting the basis of the taxpayer's alleged belief
that no return was required.
The Hatfried case was followed in Orient Investment & Finance
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,4 which also reversed a decision of the Tax
Court on substantially similar facts. The evidence was more complete
in this case, however, because it showed that the taxpayer had in fact
relied upon its accountants for advice. Nothing was withheld from
the accountants. On the other hand, the Commissioner lacked notice
of all the facts. The reversals in the Hatfried and Orient cases re-
stored these cases to the growing list of decisions which have given
relief from delinquency penalties to taxpayers who had in fact relied
upon advisors in failing to file required returns. 5 Following the
71. The Hatfried income tax return did not show that its rental income was
received from its sole stockholder, upon which fact the principal issue was decided
against the taxpayer. See 1040 Springfield Ave. Corp., note 70 mtpra at n. 3.
72. 321 U. S. 219 (1944).
73. The Tax Court took a contrary view in Hermax Co., 11 T. C. 442 (1948),
af'd per curiam, 175 F. 2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1949). See also 1040 Springfield Ave., P-H
1949 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 49,065 (1949).
74. 166 F. 2d 601 (D. C. Cir. 1948), reversing P-H 1946 TC MEai. DEC. SmV.
146,297 (1947) (on penalty issue).
75. E. g., Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge, Inc., P-H 1949 TC MEM. DEC. SERv.
49,119 (1949), todifying 12 T. C. 249 (1949); Estate of Wong Goo Shee, P-H
1948 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 148,258 (1948); Walnut St. Co. v. Glenn, 83 F. Supp.
945 (D. Ky. 1949) (tax consultant); Raymep Realty Corp., P-H 1948 TC MEM.
DEC. SERV. 1 48,069 (1948) (accountant); Garret Holding Corp., 9 T. C. 1029, 1036
(1947) (attorney); Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry Co., Inc., 9 T. C. 865, 876 (1947),
aff'd, 171 F. 2d 616 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1949) (accountant) ;
Dianna McFaddin Houk, P-H 1947 TC MEmx. DEC. SmEv. 1147,180 (1947), rev'd
on other issue, 173 F. 2d 821 (Sth Cir. 1949) (attorney) ; Frederick Smith Enterprise
Co.. P-H 1947 TC MmE. DEC. SERV. 147,148 (1947) aff'd, 167 F. 2d 356 (6th Cir.
1948) (accountant); Safety Tube Corporation, 8 T. C. 757, 766 (1947), aff'd, 168
F. 2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948) (attorney); William H. Gross, 7 T. C. 837, 848 (1946)
(attorney); Barq's Bottling Co., P-H 1946 TC MFm. DEC. SERV. 1 46,150 (1946)
(tax counsel) ; C. R. Lindback Foundation, 4 T. C. 652, 667 (1945), aff'd, 150 F. 2d
986 (3rd Cir. 1945). (attorney); Three States Lumber Co., P-H 1945 TC MEmi.
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reversals in the Hatfried and Orient cases the Tax Court said in
Raymep Realty Corp., Inc.: " "It now seems settled law that bona fide
reliance by a taxpayer on the advice of a licensed accountant, such as
occurred herein, amounts to the exercise of such ordinary business
prudence as to constitute reasonable cause for failure to file a return."
The advisor in the Raymep case was a certified public accountant.
In a prior case, Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry Co.,77 the advisor was
an accountant whose qualifications were conceded at the hearing. The
Tax Court cited the Hatfried case with approval in both cases. How-
ever, the Hatfried case was distinguished by the Tax Court in Hermax
Co., Inc.,78 recently affirmed per curiam by the same Circuit Court
which had reversed the Tax Court in the Hatfried case. The Tax
Court said the distinction was that Hermax Co., a personal holding
company, had not disclosed the pertinent facts in its income tax re-
turn. 79  However, the basic distinction between these cases appears
to be that Hatfried, Inc. employed a certified public accountant,
DEC. SERv. 145,311 (1945), reed on other .grounds, 158 F. 2d 61 (7th Cir. 1946)
(tax advisor); Bond Auto Loan Corp., P-H 1944 TC Mai. DEC. Saav. 144,318
(1944), aff'd, 153 F. 2d 50 (8th Cir. 1946) (attorney) ; Citizens Mutual Investment
Assn., P-H 1943 TC MEm. DEC. SERv. 143,257 (1943), rehearing, 46 B. T. A. 48
(1942) (attorney and auditor); Wonderland Club, Inc., P-H 1942 BTA MEif.
DEC. SEav. 1 42,523 (1942) (accountant) ; Essex Loan Trust, P-H 1942 BTA MEm.
DEC. SERv. 42,287 (1942) (accountant and attorney); Agricultural Securities Corp.,
39 B. T. A. 1103, 1105 (1939) ; aff'd, 116 F. 2d 800 (9th Cir. 1941) (tax consultant) ;
Adelaide Park Land, 25 B. T. A. 211, 212 (1932) (tax advisor) ; Adelaide McCol-
gan, Adnix., 10 B. T. A. 958, 960 (1928), dismissed (9th Cir. 1930) (attorney) ; Day-
ton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 Fed. 709 (6th Cir. 1922) (attorney);
Contra: United States v. Archer, Adm., 174 F. 2d 353 (1st Cir. 1949), reversingq 77
F. Supp. 919 (D. Mass. 1948) (attorney); Rodney, Inc. v. Hoey, 53 F. Supp. 604
(D. N. Y. 1944) (attorney) ; Hanson & Van Winkle Co., P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC.
SERV. 11 44,080 (1944) (accountant) ; Seaboard Loan & Savings Assn., Inc., 45 B. T. A.
510, 516 (1941) (accountant); Lone Pine Lawn Corp., 41 B. T. A. 638,' 643
(1940), aff'd, 121 F. 2d 935 (2d Cir. 1941) (fiscal agent); 3. S. F. Crayton, 11
B. T. A. 1375, 1377 (1928) (former dep. collector). In Bro-jeff Theatres, Inc.,
P-H 945 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 45,385 (1945), the parties narrowed the issue to
whether the "accountants had reasonable cause to believe that no return should be filed."
See Credit Bureau of Greater N. Y., Inc., P-H 1946 TC MEm. DEC. SERV. 46,229
(1946), aff'd, 162 F. 2d 7 (2d Cir. 1947) (attorney); Fides, A. G., 47 B. T. A. 280,
285 (1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 731 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 797 (1944)
(attorney). The Fides case was relied upon by the Government in the Hatlfred
appeal in support of its position that ignorance of the law is no excuse, whether it be
the fault of the taxpayer or his advisor. There is no indication in the reports of either
the Credit Bureau or the Fides cases that the advice of counsel had actually been
given to, or relied upon by, the taxpayers. See also Haywood Lumber & Mining Co.,
12 T. C. 735 (1949) (accountant), aff'd, - F. 2d - (2d Cir. 1949); Genesee
Valley Gas Co., 11 T. C. 184 (1948).
76. P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEC. SERV. 148,069 (1948).
77. 9 T. C. 865, 876 (1947), aff'd 171 F. 2d 616 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U. S. 968 (1949).
78. 11 T. C. 442 (1948), aff'd per curiarn, 175 F. 2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1949).
79. The Tax Court also said that Tarbox Corporation, 6 T. C. 35 (1946), was
controlling because "In that case, under comparable facts, we held that ignorance of
the law cannot of itself be an excuse or constitute reasonable cause for failing to
comply with it." Supra note 78 at 446. However, the accountant in the Herinax
case, unlike the accountant in the Tarbox case, was apparently familiar with the
facts. To that extent the citation of the Tarbox case conflicts with the decision in
the Hatfred case unless the latter case is restricted in its application to certified
public accountants.
RELIEF FROM DELINQUENCY PENALTIES
whereas Hermax Co. employed a "public accountant" who was not
qualified as a tax advisor. It is significant that the court made a
detailed examination of the accountant's qualifications. Although he
was admitted to practice before the Treasury Department, the Tax
Court refused to recognize this as a qualification in itself. It raised
questions concerning his "expert knowledge" in Federal tax law, as
well as a question concerning the propriety of his giving advice."0
The conclusion to be drawn from the Hermax case is that tax-
payers have the burden of showing the individual qualifications of
their advisors. This case even leaves some doubt whether it is enough
to show that the advisor was licensed as a certified public accountant.
Nevertheless such proof should be sufficient under the Hatfried rule,
which accords recognition to the qualifications of certified public
accountants and attorneys 81 as a class.
CONCLUSION
Delinquency penalty issues are secondary issues in most cases;
and taxpayers frequently fail to offer all the evidence necessary for
relief from such penalties. No other factor has had more influence
in shaping the pattern of the penalty cases than the failure to prove
all the facts which show a reasonable cause for the delinquency. It is
hoped that the foregoing discussion has outlined the burden of proof
in such cases.
To summarize:
Taxpayers who assert their inability to file a required return
must show that they exercised ordinary business care and prudence
in attempting to file the return.
Taxpayers who believed that no return was required must show
the basis for their belief and further show that it was reasonable.
The above rules also apply to delinquencies caused by taxpayers'
agents.
80. The Tax Court said: "In passing, it may be questioned whether it was proper
for them [the accountant and the 'tax man' in his firm] to give such advice. See In
re Bernard Berctw, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department,
No. 161, April 12, 1948." Note 78 supra at 497.
81. There are also close analogies in other fields of law. For example, the
initiation of proceedings without probable cause is one of the elements of a cause of
action for wrongful prosecution of criminal proceedings (malicious prosecution) or
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings. In such cases the reliance upon the advice
of reputable and disinterested counsel, sought in good faith after a full disclosure
of the facts, is conclusive of the existence of probable cause. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§§ 666, 675 (1934). Cf. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 428, comment k (1938). See
RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 201, comment b (1935). In such cases, however, the advice
of an attorney who made a contingent fee arrangement before the facts were sub-
mitted to him is the advice of an interested party and does not protect the client.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 675, comment h (1934).
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Taxpayers who relied upon the advice of an attorney or accountant
must show that all necessary facts were given in good faith to the
advisor and that he was qualified to give tax advice.
Penalties for failure to file estate and gift tax returns may be
avoided for reasonable cause only if late returns are ultimately filed
by such taxpayers. The retention of this requirement for gift and
estate taxes while omitting it for income taxes appears to have been
an oversight on the part of the draftsmen 6f the Code. In any event,
the Code should be amended to provide uniform conditions for relief
from income, estate and gift tax delinquencies.
